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INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY. Edited 
by Thomas E. Cronin. I Lawrence, Kansas: University Press 
of Kansas. 1989. Pp. xii, 404. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $12.95. 
Glen E. Thurow 2 
Professor Thomas Cronin, one of the leading scholars of the 
presidency, has gathered fourteen essays from twelve different con-
temporary authors into Inventing the American Presidency. He has 
also included Federalist Papers 69-73 and relevant sections of the 
Constitution. Half of the essays have appeared in print previously. 
However, the book is not a random collection of essays on the presi-
dency. It is designed to provide a comprehensive account of the 
creation of the presidency by examining the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the debates surrounding the Convention, and the precedents 
set by the first presidents. The book is divided into four essays on 
the structure of the presidency (each one treating a different ele-
ment of its design), five on some major powers of the presidency, 
and essays on each of the first four presidents plus Hamilton. The 
book concludes with Hamilton's defense and explanation of the 
presidency from the Federalist. The result is a remarkably useful 
and enlightening collection, in which the many disagreements 
among the authors serve to enhance the reader's understanding of 
the issues in dispute among the framers of the presidency. 
In Federalist 70 Hamilton writes, "There is an idea, which is 
not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent 
with the genius of republican government." Hamilton then attacks, 
and contemptuously dismisses, the view that republican govern-
ments do not need a strong executive, concluding that "all men of 
sense" have to agree "in the necessity of an energetic executive." 
Although in this way he converts the original idea from an indict-
ment of executive power to a charge against republican government, 
Hamilton nevertheless acknowledges the difficulty of reconciling re-
publican government and executive energy. And in spite of the fact 
that Hamilton proceeds to defend republican government by argu-
ing that the Constitution has reconciled republicanism and an ener-
getic executive, the tension between the two continues to animate 
the best political and scholarly discussions of the American presi-
dency, including those in Inventing the American Presidency. 
The essays in the book on the structure of the presidency are 
I. McHugh Professor of American Institutions and Leadership, The Colorado 
College. 
2. Professor of Politics, University of Dallas. 
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generally careful accounts of the ideas and causes that led to the 
formation of particular aspects of that structure. Michael Nelson 
shows how the Convention arrived at the age, residency, and citi-
zenship requirements for the president; Schlomo Slonin shows that 
the electoral college was not designed by accident or to thwart the 
majority, but to reconcile many different pressures of theory and 
practice; Thomas Cronin, in discussing the tenure of the president 
and his reeligibility, is particularly good at bringing out the connec-
tion between the form of the office and the ends it is meant to serve; 
and John Labovitz shows why impeachment remains a rare and 
generally ineffective check on presidential power. It is interesting, 
however, that the real clashes in the book begin when it turns from 
the issues of static structure to those of the powers of the president 
and the actions of presidents. It is in its dynamism that the presi-
dency reveals its colors. 
The view criticized by Hamilton in Federalist 70, that republi-
can theory requires rejection of a vigorous executive, is most clearly 
represented in this collection by Ralph Ketchum, writing on 
Madison's presidency. Ketchum argues that Madison's weakness, 
indecision, and hesitation as president must be seen in a broader 
perspective to represent the triumph of a properly republican con-
ception of the office. The executive, argues Ketchum, should "take 
its lead in policy from the legislature and be the executor of its will." 
The president is under the law and the law is made by the legisla-
ture. Madison's acceptance of unfortunate appointments forced on 
him by Congress, his failure to remedy Congress's inadequate prep-
arations for war or to arouse the people's fighting spirit, his patient 
endurance of nearly treasonable opposition, and his scrupulous re-
gard in wartime for civil liberties represent policy failures. But, 
Ketchum holds, they also reflect principled adherence to the proper 
role of a republican executive subordinate to the law, the legislature, 
and the people. And Madison's example, if heeded, might have 
saved us from the imperial excesses of Richard Nixon. Ketchum 
concludes that it is better to endure bad policy than to accept mo-
narchical or tyrannical principles. 
Ketchum's view is not as naive as it may appear, but one won-
ders if he fully understands the choice he advocates. He sees a kin-
ship between Lincoln's and Madison's presidencies, implying that if 
we accept the Madisonian view of the presidency, we can still have 
our Lincolns. But he can establish this kinship only by ignoring the 
means used by Lincoln to achieve his noble ends of preserving the 
Union and putting slavery on the road to extinction. Lincoln not 
only acted outside of laws passed by Congress, but publicly stated 
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that he regarded himself as entitled even to violate provisions of the 
Constitution if that were the only way to save the Union. In this 
respect Lincoln seems less a kin of Madison than of the dreaded 
Nixon. One can draw some distinctions of degree between Nixon's 
ends and Lincoln's, but the fact remains that the rule of law may 
stand in the way of good as well as of evil. 
Ketchum's view is largely shared by David Adler, who con-
tributes essays on the powers of war-making and pardoning. Adler 
maintains that the president is given no power to initiate military 
hostilities: the war-making power belongs to Congress. And he 
holds that the framers unanimously held this view. Accordingly, 
Adler believes that the War Powers Resolution, which grants the 
president such power in limited situations, unwisely and unconstitu-
tionally expands the constitutional powers of the president. 
Adler is right, of course, that the power to declare war was, 
and was understood to be, given to Congress, but he underesti-
mates the ambiguity of that grant. When discussing the Pacificus-
Helvidius debate, for example, he concludes that Hamilton and 
Madison agree in the decisive respect because both acknowledge 
that the power to commence war is in Congress. But he ignores the 
implications of Hamilton's argument that the power to declare war 
is an executive power given to Congress, and thus to be construed 
narrowly. If so, while it is technically correct that only Congress 
can declare war, the president might act with full constitutional 
warrant to place Congress in such a situation that it had no choice 
but to declare war, as Hamilton notes. And if it is an executive 
power, perhaps associated with other executive powers and requir-
ing quick and secret discretion in particular circumstances, the ar-
gument that Congress might delegate some aspects of this power is 
enhanced. 
Consistently with the view that the Constitution establishes a 
strictly limited executive power, Adler argues that the president's 
pardoning power is an anomaly because it is legally unlimited. Full 
of indignation at the Nixon pardon, and fearing that other guilty 
Republicans may be pardoned in the future, he concludes that the 
Constitution ought to be amended to give Congress the power to 
veto presidential pardons. Yet Adler is aware of the powerful argu-
ment that an unbridled and conclusive pardoning power in the pres-
ident might be essential in cases of insurrection in order to quell the 
unrest as peacefully and quickly as possible. The possibility of over-
turning a presidential pardon would allow such situations to con-
tinue to fester as a possibly contentious Congress delayed action, 
even if it did not overturn the pardon. And he perhaps underesti-
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mates the political, as opposed to the legal, constraints on the presi-
dent's pardoning power-constraints familiar enough to both 
Reagan and Bush. 
Bruce Miroff suggests that John Adams combined the strong 
and weak presidency in a peculiar mix: the executive should be 
strong, but not energetic. Adams favored a president who has all of 
the prerogative power of the British monarch but who would use 
this power only in a nonpartisan, defensive, and sparing manner. 
The moderation of this president would come from his disinterest-
edness and love of fame, rather than from constitutional restraints. 
Miroff is not impressed by Adams's picture of a virtuous president 
and concludes that Adams was wrong in believing that the presi-
dency could be freed from partisanship or that it was safe to give it 
regal powers. But, again with the imperial presidency in mind, he 
likes the idea that the president should not do much. 
Glen Phelps shows us a more successful combination of the 
strong and the deferential presidency in Washington, who used his 
initiative and virtue to elevate the rule of law represented by the 
Constitution. 
Robert Spitzer's essay on the veto power moves us into sight of 
the energetic executive. He argues that the proper use of the veto 
power is not limited to defense of the presidency and the Constitu-
tion, as many supposed in the early years of the republic. Instead, 
he envisions the veto as a tool designed to give the president a role 
"in actively shaping legislation." 
Perhaps the most expansive theory of presidential power is the 
idea that he has a prerogative power, a constitutional right to act 
against the law for the sake of the common good. In investigating 
this claim, Robert Scigliano finds the concept neither in John Locke 
(where scholars often say they find it) nor in the American founders 
(except possibly in regard to the pardoning power). Both Locke 
and the founders do acknowledge that it might be proper for the 
executive to act according to the spirit, rather than the letter, of the 
law. Scigliano suggests that one must look to Lincoln to find a justi-
fication of prerogative power in the president. 
Yet Scigliano also notes that the founders did recognize the 
necessity to sometimes act against the law. As Jefferson wrote, 
"The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country 
when in danger, are of higher obligation" than "a strict observance 
of the written laws". In such circumstances one should act and risk 
the consequences of illegality, throwing oneself on the mercy of 
Congress or the people to forgive or vindicate his actions. In Jeffer-
son's view, this power should not be explicitly conferred: to ac-
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knowledge the need for such power in the Constitution would risk 
its use in times when it was not truly needed. 
In his article on Jefferson, Gary Schmitt observes that Hamil-
ton might respond to Jefferson by noting that extra-constitutional 
actions may be necessary fairly frequently (as, indeed, they appar-
ently were during Jefferson's presidency). A precedent for acting 
outside the Constitution then becomes established, and undermines 
respect for a Constitution seen to be inadequate for the exigencies 
men must face. It is better, in Hamilton's view, for the Constitution 
to authorize all the executive powers that are in fact sometimes 
necessary. 
In a suggestive essay on Hamilton, John Koritansky argues 
that Hamilton's energetic executive has won less than a complete 
victory in American constitutional history because it contains 
within it a profoundly illiberal passion at odds with Hamilton's gen-
eral understanding of government. On the one hand Hamilton 
grasped more clearly than other founders the non-partisan aspira-
tions of modem liberalism: government has no public purpose 
other than preventing "social measures whereby one factious inter-
est gains at the expense of the whole." Good administration, not 
the proper partisan choice, becomes the end of government. 
On the other hand, good administration requires that "the 'first 
characters of the Union' be drawn to public service by the natural 
'ruling passion of the noblest minds.' " But to regard governing it-
self as noble-more noble than self-interest, and therefore attractive 
to such minds-is to forget that the purpose of government is 
merely to serve the private self-interests of the citizens. At the heart 
of Hamilton's energetic executive we find the illiberal notion that 
the development of the political virtues of the rulers is the purpose 
of the regime, and that ruling is a prize to be won, not a burden to 
be borne. 
But is this contradiction to be found in Hamilton's thought? 
And is American constitutionalism as opposed to the cultivation of 
virtue as Koritansky suggests? On the basis of Federalist 35, 
Koritansky argues that Hamilton understood capitalists to be the 
true representatives of the American people because their pursuit of 
material wealth reflected the non-partisan pursuit of material well-
being in Americans as a whole. It may be true that Hamilton pro-
moted capitalists and capitalism because of their tendency to under-
mine all established classes, especially those of inherited wealth. 
But there is little evidence that Hamilton thought that the final pur-
pose of government was to foster or protect private gain. Koritan-
sky overlooks the fact that capitalists are not presented in Federalist 
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35 as the representatives of the American people, but as the repre-
sentatives of one set of economic interests. In addition to the 
merchants, the legislature will consist of middling fanners and, even 
more importantly, "men of the learned professions" will hold the 
balance of power. It is they, and not the capitalists, who fonn "no 
distinct interest" in society according to Hamilton. 
We should also remember that Hamilton is not the only author 
to praise ambition in the Federalist, as No. 51 makes clear. Is Ham-
ilton's praise for the nobility of ruling more dangerous to, or incom-
patible with, American constitutionalism than Jefferson's pretense 
of a weak president combined with the reality of extra-constitu-
tional adventures? 
Thomas Cronin believes that the strong Hamiltonian executive 
has triumphed in modem practice. If Hamilton looked to the tri-
umph of the "noblest minds," we may doubt that this has occurred. 
Perhaps even the strength of the modem executive is not fully 
Hamiltonian, as Koritansky implies. And that strength sometimes 
seems overshadowed by an even greater assertiveness in Congress 
and the courts. The balance of executive energy and subordination 
to the rule of law cannot be seen apart from that balance in the 
government as a whole. 
LIBERAL NEUTRALITY. Edited by Robert E. Goodin' 
and Andrew Reeve.2 London and New York: Routledge. 
1989. Pp. 219. Cloth, $49.95. 
Larry Alexander3 
That the state must be "neutral" among its citizens and their 
various views of the "the Good" is an axiom of a popular concep-
tion of liberalism, a conception held by, among others, John Rawls,4 
David Richards,s Bruce Ackennan,6 and Ronald Dworkin.? To the 
extent that this conception of liberalism is enshrined in the Consti-
tution according to one's favorite theory of interpretation, as, for 
I. Professional Fellow in Philosophy. Australian National University. 
2. Lecturer in Politics, University of Warwick. 
3. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
4. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
5. D. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989); D. 
RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986). 
6. B. ACKERMAN, SociAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
7. Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113-43 (S. Hampshire 
ed. 1948). 
